Appeals

In law, an appeal is a process for requesting a formal change to an official decision.

Quotes

 * APPEAL, v.t. In law, to put the dice into the box for another throw.
 * Ambrose Bierce, The Cynic's Dictionary (1906); republished as The Devil's Dictionary (1911).


 * Those who sit in judgment merely give utterance to the prejudices which they have imbibed at home, and think they have duly performed their part if they do not order punishment to be inflicted on any one until convicted, either on his own confession, or on legal evidence. But of what crime convicted? “Of that condemned doctrine,” is the answer. But with what justice condemned? The very essence of the defence was, not to abjure the doctrine itself, but to maintain its truth. On this subject, however, not a whisper is allowed!
 * Justice, then, most invincible Sovereign, entitles me to demand that you will undertake a thorough investigation of this cause, which has hitherto been tossed about in any kind of way, and handled in the most irregular manner, without any order of law, and with passionate heat rather than judicial gravity.
 * John Calvin's appeal to King Francis in preface to Institutes of the Christian Religion

The Dictionary of Legal Quotations (1904)

 * Quotes reported in James William Norton-Kyshe, The Dictionary of Legal Quotations (1904), p. 13-15.


 * It is the glory and happiness of our excellent constitution, that to prevent any injustice no man is to be concluded by the first judgment; but that if he apprehends himself to be aggrieved, he has another Court to which he can resort for relief; for this purpose the law furnishes him with appeals, with writs of error and false judgment.
 * John Pratt, L.C.J., King v. Chancellor, &c, of the University of Cambridge (1720), 1 Str. Rep. 564.


 * A number of American authorities were cited in the course of the argument, which may be briefly noticed, seeing that they were made the subject of comment in both Courts below.
 * Lord Watson, Huntington v. Attrill, 62 L. J. Rep. P. C. C. 1893, p. 49.


 * In coming to that conclusion, as I do upon principle, I am much strengthened by the American authorities to which my attention has been called.
 * Fry, J., Steel v. Dixon (1881), L. R. 17 C. D. 831, 50 L. J. Ch. 593.


 * A rule of such general adoption shows that there is nothing in it inconsistent with the relative rights and duties of principal and surety, and that it accords with a common sense of justice and the natural equity of mankind.
 * Chancellor Kent, Hayes v. Ward (1819), 4 Johns. (U.S.) Ch. Rep. 132.


 * I think it beyond question that it is generally the duty of an appellate Judge to leave undisturbed a decision of which he does not clearly disapprove. I conceive that, in our Court, as in the civil law, it is the rule that "gravely to doubt is to affirm."
 * Knight Bruce, L.J., The Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Beverley (1854), 24 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Part 7, Chan. p. 376.


 * It is needless to enter into many reasons for quashing the conviction, when one alone is fully sufficient.
 * Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Jarvis (1756), 1 Burr. Part IV., p. 152.


 * It has not been deemed improper by the best of Judges to say that it would be a satisfaction not to them only, but to the profession at large, if a point of novelty and difficulty were taken to the Court of Appeal.
 * Kekeioich, J., In re England, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. [1895], p. 109.


 * If no appeal were possible, I have no great hesitation in saying that this would not be a desirable country to live in. . . . It is quite true that there is enough difficulty in appealing as it is; but if there is to be no appeal at all possible the system would be intolerable.
 * Bowen, L.J., The Queen v. Justices of County of London, &c. (1893), L.R. 2Q.B. 492.


 * A decision of the House of Lords requires no sanction.
 * Kekewich, J., In re Weall Andrews v. Weall (1889), L. R. 42 Ch. D. 679.


 * A solemn decision of a competent Judge is by no means to be disregarded, and I ought not to overrule it without being clearly satisfied in my own mind that the decision is erroneous.
 * Lord Longdaie, M.R., Ward v. Painter (1839), 2 Beav. 93.


 * I should be desirous that my opinion should not be conclusive on the parties, if there were any mode by which our judgment could be reviewed in a Court of error.
 * Lord Kenyon, C.J., Petrie v. White (1789), 3 T. R. 9.


 * I am desirous that the case should be brought under the consideration of a higher tribunal, without any unnecessary delay, and to afford every facility in my power for the correction of any error into which I may have fallen.
 * Lord Langdale, M.R., Tullett v. Armstrong (1838), 1 Beav. 31.


 * It is a great satisfaction for me to find, that this matter will undergo investigation elsewhere, before it is finally decided.
 * Lord Langdale, M.R., Wilson v. Eden (1850), 12 Beav. 459.


 * I trust I have not misinterpreted the views of the Court of Appeal in a matter of so much importance, and, further, that if I have, any misconceptions of mine may be speedily removed by the decision of a higher tribunal.
 * Stirling, J., Verner v. General, &c. Trust (1894), L. R. 2 C. D. [1894], p. 260.


 * A decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law is conclusive, and binds the House in subsequent cases. An erroneous decision can be set right only by an Act of Parliament.
 * London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council (1898), L. R. Ap. Ca. [1898], 375.