Heinz Guderian

Heinz Guderian (17 June 1888 – 14 May 1954) was a Nazi German World War II general and tank commander, theorist of tank combat and one of the developers of blitzkrieg strategy. He was not charged with any war crimes during the Nuremberg Trials since his actions and behavior were ruled to be consistent with those of a professional soldier. Heinz Guderian died at the age of 65, in Schwangau near Füssen (Southern Bavaria) and is buried at the Friedhof Hildesheimerstrasse in Goslar.

Quotes



 * Actions speak louder than words. In the days to come the Goddess of Victory will bestow her laurels only on those who prepared to act with daring.
 * Achtung-Panzer! : The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential (1937)


 * The moral and intellectual condition of a nation may certainly prove of decisive importance on its own account, but all due attention must also be paid to material considerations. When a nation has to reckon with a struggle against superior forces on several fronts, it must neglect nothing that may conduce to the betterment of its situation.
 * Achtung-Panzer! : The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential (1937)


 * We have severely underestimated the Russians, the extent of the country and the treachery of the climate. This is the revenge of reality.
 * Letter to his wife (9 November 1941) on the German failures in Operation Barbarossa and the battles of the Eastern Front, quoted in Images of Kursk : History's Greatest Tank Battle, July 1943 (2002) by Nikolas Cornish, p. 6; also in The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (2009) by Andrew Roberts, p. 409


 * To imitate the ostrich in political matters has never been a satisfactory method of avoiding danger; yet this is what Hitler, as well as his more important political, economic and even military advisers, chose to do over and over again. The consequences of this deliberate blindness in the face of hard facts were devastating; and it was we who now had to bear them.
 * On the failure of Hitler and his advisors to face realities of various situations, especially those of the military on the Eastern Front, in Panzer Leader (1952), Ch. 6 : The Campaign in Russia, p. 190


 * It has been deduced from Hitler's great power over the masses that the Germans are an unusually suggestible race. But in all countries and at all times men have succumbed to the suggestive powers of unusual personalities, even if the wielders of those powers were not always good men in the Christian sense.
 * Panzer Leader (1952), Ch. 13 : Leading Personalities of the Third Reich, p. 432


 * Es gibt keine verzweifelten Lagen, es gibt nur verzweifelte Menschen.
 * There are no desperate situations, there are only desperate people.
 * As quoted in Die Deutschen gepanzerten Truppen bis 1945 (1965) by Oskar Munzel


 * Man schlägt jemanden mit der Faust und nicht mit gespreizten Fingern.
 * You hit somebody with your fist and not with your fingers spread.
 * As quoted in Die Deutschen gepanzerten Truppen bis 1945 (1965) by Oskar Munzel, p. 209; this indicated the need to concentrate tank forces for one strong push in one direction and not distribute them over a large area.


 * Der Motor des Panzers ist ebenso seine Waffe wie die Kanone.
 * The engine of the Panzer is a weapon just as the main-gun.
 * As quoted in Die Deutschen gepanzerten Truppen bis 1945 (1965) by Oskar Munzel, p. 159


 * It's simply our duty to save these people, and we still have time to remove them! But it's useless to sacrifice men in this senseless way. It's high time! We must evacuate those soldiers at once!
 * Arguing with Adolf Hitler about the German army being cut off in the Courland Pocket; as quoted in Inside the Third Reich : Memoirs (1971) by Albert Speer, p. 534


 * Logistics is the ball and chain of armored warfare.
 * As quoted in Sword Point (1988) by Harold Coyle, p. 141


 * When the situation is obscure, attack.
 * As quoted in Waging Business Warfare (1988) David J. Rogers, p. 236


 * Nicht Kleckern sondern Klotzen!
 * Boot 'em, don't spatter 'em!
 * As quoted in How Great Generals Win (1993) by Bevin Alexander, p. 227; this statement became a stock phrase which Hitler often repeated. It is comparable to the adage "Don't do things by half."


 * If the tanks succeed, then victory follows.
 * As quoted in Panzerkrieg : The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions (2002) by Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron, p. 33


 * Fahrkarte bis zur Endstation.
 * Ticket to the last station.
 * Shouted to his Panzertroops as they were passing him, indicating that they should go as far as they could; as quoted in Panzerkrieg : The Rise and Fall of Hitler's Tank Divisions (2002) by Peter McCarthy and Mike Syron, p. 83


 * New weapons require new tactics. Never put new wine into old bottles.
 * As quoted in Cavalry from Hoof to Track (2009) by Roman Jarymowycz, Ch. 16 : Cold Warhorse: Pegasus ex Machina

Quotes about Guderian

 * The good news for Liddell Hart was that his work was hugely influential. The bad news was that it was hugely influential not in Britain but in Germany. With the notable exception of Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, senior British commanders like Field Marshal Earl Haig simply refused to accept that 'the aeroplane, the tank [and] the motor car [would] supersede the horse in future wars', dismissing motorized weapons as mere 'accessories to the man and horse'. Haig's brother concurred: the cavalry would 'never be scrapped to make room for the tanks'. By contrast, younger German officers immediately grasped the significance of Liddell Hart's work. Among his most avid fans was Heinz Guderian, commander of the 19th German Army Corps in the invasion of Poland. As Guderian recalled, it was from Liddell Hart and other British pioneers of 'a new type of warfare on the largest scale' that he learned the importance of 'the concentration of armour'.
 * Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (2006), pp. 386-387


 * Hitler might have waged his war against the Soviet Union more intelligently. Again, he might have listened to the experts (Halder and Guderian among them), who advised him to concentrate German efforts on capturing Moscow rather than diverting Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group southwards towards Kiev. In a similar vein, Hitler might not have squandered his 6th Army so profligately at Stalingrad; Alan Brooke's fear was that Paulus might instead conquer the Caucasus, opening the way to the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf oilfields.
 * Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West (2006), pp. 514